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PROVING VIOLATIONS OR PROVING AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BY MICHAEL R. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Public awareness of the extent of work-derived injuries and illnesses
and consequent economic losses1 led to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).2 The enactment of OSHA led to a separate
body of law - OSHA law.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Review
Commission) was created to resolve contests initiated by employers who
were cited by the United States Secretary of labor for violations of
OSHA.3 A final Review Commission decision is appealed to the United
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation was alleged
to have occurred.4 This review scheme permits a Review Commission
precedent decision on a point of law to be at odds with decisions of one
or more courts of appeal. Nonetheless, Review Commission decisions
are published.5 Therefore, respondents who have appeared before the
Review Commission have had access to all federal-OSHA case law.
States are allowed the option of being subject to federal-OSHA or ad-
* Michael R. Smith is an Education and Training Specialist with the OSH Division of the
North Carolina Department of Labor. He earned his bachelor's and master's degrees at Appalach-
ian State University and his doctorate at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Mr.
Smith's work at NC-OSHA includes compiling and indexing the North Carolina Occupational Safety
and Health Decisions. His other publications in the area of OSHA law include: A Guide to OSHA in
North Carolina (1989), A Guide to Procedures of the Safety and Health Review Board of North Caro-
lina (1988), and OSHA Law in North Carolina (1985 and 1988 supplement).
1. In 1969, 2.25 million American employees were disabled by accidents at work. The best
statistics then available permitted the estimate of 336,000 cases of work-related diseases for 1969.
Over $1.5 billion in lost wages resulted from the injuries and illnesses. The loss to the national
economy was estimated to have exceeded $8 billion. Employment Safety and Health Guide, CCH,
501, at 305 (1986).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1985). The legislation was originally signed into law on December 29,
1970.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (1985).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) 1985.
5. Occupational Safety and Health Cases are published by the Bureau of National Affairs
(OSHC or BNA); Occupational Safety and Health Decisions are published by Commerce Clearing-
house (OSHD) CCH publishes synopses of administrative law judge decisions and the full text of
Review Commission decisions.
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ministering their own occupational safety and health plan.6 The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of North Carolina (OSHANC or Act)
became law in 1973. 7
The Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina (Review
Board) was created to resolve contests initiated by employers who were
cited by the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor for violations of the
Act.8 The Review Board is composed of hearing examiners, for adjudi-
cation at the trial level, and an appellate body.9 Appeal of final Review
Board decisions begins in the superior court.10
The structure for administrative and judicial review of OSHANC deci-
sions in North Carolina avoids the appearance of case law disparateness
found within the federal-OSHA arena. However, unlike federal-OSHA,
OSHANC decisions have not previously been published."1
Parties and the judiciary have been disadvantaged by lack of access to
North Carolina OSHA case law. The absence of published case law has
also hindered attempts to write about North Carolina OSHA law as it
has developed. Now, however, North Carolina OSHA case law is being
published. This article predominantly cites to that newly-published case
law. 
1 2
The scope of this article is developed below. However, in summary, it
sets forth the Commissioner of Labor's burden of proof (as developed by
case law in this state) vis-d-vis citations for violations variously denomi-
nated. Also included are selected defenses.
I. PROVING VIOLATIONS
The General Assembly of North Carolina elected the North Carolina
Department of Labor to administer the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of North Carolina. The Commissioner of Labor (Commissioner) or
6. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1985).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126 to 160 (1985 and Supp. 1988).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135(a) (1985).
9. It should be noted that in 1988 OSHANC was amended to direct notices of contest from
agricultural employers to the Office of Administrative Hearings. An administrative law judge issues
a "recommended decision." The Review Board reviews the recommended decision for error and
makes the "final agency" decision. Appeal is to the superior court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-135(j),
95-137(b)(5) (1988).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-141 (1988).
11. Except, of course, for state court of appeals and supreme court decisions..
12. North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Decisions (compiled and indexed by M.
Smith), Volumes I and 2, contain all decisions of both levels of the Review Board and all OSHA-
related decisions of the state courts, superior through supreme court. The two initial volumes report
decisions through February 11, 1988. The first advance sheets for Volume 3 are being prepared for
publication. Cases decided after February 11, 1988 which have not yet been published can be found
in law libraries or public libraries in Asheville, Chapel Hill, Charlotte, Fayetteville, Greensboro,
Raleigh and Wilmington, North Carolina. Unpublished decisions are identifiable by docket
(OSHANC) number.
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his designee is empowered to enforce the Act.13
The Act's Enforcement Provisions
The Act is prevention-oriented. It seeks to prevent job-related injuries
and illnesses.' 4 There is reliance upon voluntary cooperative efforts of
employers and employees to accomplish the objective of the Act. 15
Voluntary compliance with OSHANC standards is also critically im-
portant. The ratio of businesses to OSHANC enforcement personnel will
always guarantee the importance of voluntary compliance. 16 Nonethe-
less, the Commissioner is charged with ensuring that the purpose of the
Act is effected. The Commissioner may promulgate safety and health
standards, 7 inspect workplaces to determine compliance with OSHANC
standards,18 issue citations, 9 and assess penalties20 for alleged violations
of the standards.
Employers and Employees Covered by the Act
The Act protects employees, as opposed to the general public.
OSHANC extends to most employers and employees in North Carolina.
Migrant workers,2 ' contractors on federal work projects,22 salaried man-
agement employees, 23 and employees of public agencies 24 have been de-
termined to be protected by OSHANC.
Not covered by OSHANC are employers and employees who are: em-
ployed by the federal government; protected by particular federal acts;
engaged in maritime operations; 25 and, domestic workers employed in
their employer's home.26 Additionally, particular businesses with fewer
than eleven employees with lost workday injury rates below the national
average are exempted from programmed safety inspections. Similar ex-
emption is extended to farms with fewer than eleven employees which do
not maintain a temporary labor camp.27
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126(b)(2)(m), 95-136 - 95-139 (1985).
14. Id. at § 95-126(b)(1) (1985).
15. Id. at § 95-126(b)(2)(a)-(b) (1985).
16. M. Smith, OSHA Law in North Carolina § 6.2 (1985).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-131 (1985).
18. Id. at § 95-136.
19. Id. at § 95-137.
20. Id. at § 95-138.
21. Brooks v. Frank David Zimmerman, Grower, 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 88-1460 (1988).
22. Nye v. Cieszko Construction Co., 1 NCOSHD 172 (1977).
23. Brooks v. Cumulus Fibers, Inc., I NCOSHD 989 (1983).
24. Brooks v. Onslow County Economic Development Comm'n., 2 NCOSHD 522 (RB 1984).
The Commissioner may not impose monetary penalties upon public agencies. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 95-148 (1985).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-128 (1985).
26. Id. at § 95-127(10).
27. Employment Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 518. The federal government does not provide
3
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Employers must obey OSHANC standards, and the so-called "Gen-
eral Duty Clause." Employers are only cited for alleged violations of the
General Duty Clause when their own employees are exposed to
hazards.28 When OSHANC standards are cited, an employer in control
of a condition may be liable for employees of other contractors and for
independent contractors.29
Applicable Standards
OSHANC standards may be promulgated by the Commissioner. They
must be as effective as comparable federal-OSHA standards promulgated
by the United States Secretary of Labor, or the Commissioner may adopt
the federal-OSHA standards.30 Employers must comply with OSHANC
standards and with the General Duty Clause requirement to provide
workplaces and work conditions free from recognized hazards.31
The Act provides for employer and employee participation in the stan-
dard-promulgation process. Notice of proposals for new or changed
standards is published by the United States Secretary of Labor in the
Federal Register. 2 The Secretary of Labor provides opportunities for
comment by interested persons. In similar fashion, the Commissioner of
Labor notifies the public by publishing his intentions regarding
OSHANC standards in newspapers throughout the State. Public hear-
ings are held, and comments are solicited.
33
The Review Board has held that employers cited for alleged violations
of OSHANC standards may challenge them as unconstitutional. The
right is irrespective of the length of time since the standard was promul-
gated or whether the employer had previously challenged it.
34
Comments regarding the feasibility of standards may be lodged during
the standard promulgation process. Nonetheless, in certain instances,
the Commissioner is required to prove that the correction of a condition
in accordance with the cited standard is feasible.35
Any employer may petition for a variance from a standard, 6 or for the
appropriations for such inspections. OSHANC (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-128(6) (1985)) exempts em-
ployers and employees in classes of employment for which matching federal funding is not provided
to these state for enforcement purposes.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 126-51.
29. Nye v. Wadsworth Wrecking Co., 2 NCOSHD 50 (RB 1977), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 55,
Docket No. 77 CvS 762 (Superior Ct. 1977).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-131(a) (1985 and Supp. 1987).
31. Id. at §§ 95-129(1)-(2) (1985).
32. Id. at § 95-131(b)(7) (1985).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-131(b)(3)-(4) (1985).
34. Creel v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 2 NCOSHD 13 (RB 1976), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 19, Docket
No. 76 CvS 4671 (Superior Ct. 1978).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-132 (1985).
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modification of a time period specified in a citation for the correction of a
condition.37 In either instance, the burden of proving the inability to
comply is upon the employer.
BURDEN OF PROOF - GENERALLY
Regarding OSHANC issues, the allocation of the burden of proof, the
elements to be proven, and the quantum of proof, are found in the Act,
the Review Board's Rules of Procedure, and decisions of the Board and
North Carolina courts.
The Review Board operates under its own rules.38 Except for matters
which regard agricultural employers, the Board is exempt from the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.39
Questions regarding the burden of proof are answered as case law de-
velops, if the questions are essential to deciding the issues.' ° If an issue
can be satisfactorily resolved, an ancillary burden of proof question will
not be decided. 4
OSHANC proceedings are civil and administrative, and penalties in-
volved "are civil ... rather than penal."42 The quantum of proof for the
civil OSHANC proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence,43
rather than clear and convincing evidence. 44 The quantum of proof is
the preponderance of the evidence for establishing citations, and for
proving particular defenses.
In proceedings before the Review Board, the Commissioner bears the
burden of proving each element in the citation.45 The employer has no
burden of proof with respect to allegations in the citation.46
When a citation is issued to an employer it must specify the standard
or other regulation which was allegedly violated, "describe with particu-
larity the nature of the violation," and set a reasonable time period for
the abatement of the violation. 47 In addition, there must be proof of em-
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-137(4) (1985), 95-137(5) (1988); R.P. .0305 (Rules of Procedure of
the Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina, § .0305 (hereinafter R.P.)).
38. Brooks v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 412, 63 N.C. App. 106, 304 S.E.2d
619 (1983).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150(B)(1)(d) (Supp. 1988).
40. See for example, Brooks v. Quality Embroidery, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 87-1368
(RB 1988) regarding economic feasibility.
41. See Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSCH 227 (RB 1981) regarding proof of enforce-
ment of the employer's safety program.
42. Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp. 2 NCOSHD 277, 281 (RB.198 1).
43. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 299 (RB 1981).
44. Brooks v. Budd-Piper Roofing Co., 2 NCOSHD 323 (RB 1983).
45. R.P. .0514(a).
46. Creel v. Safety and Health Review Board and Gastonia Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 2
NCOSHD 9 (Superior Ct. 1975).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(a) (1985).
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ployer access to the violative condition,4" and there must be proof of
employer knowledge of the condition and/or standard.49
Thus, to summarize the Commissioner's burden, generally, to establish
a prima facie case, there must be proof that: (1) the cited standard or
regulation is applicable; (2) there was a condition in contravention of the
standard or regulation; (3) an employee had access to the condition; and,
(4) there was employer knowledge.
BURDEN OF PROOF - SPECIFICALLY - CITATIONS, NOTICES
Information in this section first addresses elements (except for the sub-
ject of employer knowledge) which must be established by the Commis-
sioner of Labor to prove notices, or citations of various types; then
addresses employer knowledge. Employer knowledge is treated sepa-
rately because, depending upon the type of alleged violation, the re-
searcher may need easy access to information about employer knowledge
as it relates in various ways. A citation which alleges a serious-repeated
violation of a generally-phrases standard would occasion such a
necessity.
Elements of the Burden of Proof, Except for Employer Knowledge
The citation or notice which must be proven by the Commissioner
may characterize the alleged violation by either of, or by a combination
of, the following denominations: de minimus; nonserious; serious; re-
peated; willful; failure to correct. Additionally, the citation or notice will
allege a violation of, or a failure to abate: a specific standard; a generally-
phrased standard; a standard which may require the use of "feasible"
controls; or the General Duty Clause.
The denomination of the alleged violation and the cited standard or
regulation may invoke additional elements of proof which the Commis-
sioner must establish. For example, in particular instances, the Commis-




The Act allows the Director to issue notices rather than citations
"with respect to de minimus violations which have no direct or immedi-
ate relationship to safety or health, and violations of State agencies or
48. See infra text accompanying notes 87-101.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 206-11.
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political subdivisions thereof."5 ° Though de minimus violations are not
at issue at hearings,5" the Commissioner may elect to reduce citations for
nonserious violations to de minimus violations, at the hearing.52
Hearing examiners may treat as de minimus what they view as techni-
cal nonserious violations of standards." Similarly, treatment of nonseri-
ous violations as de minimus may provide the rationale for the
elimination of a penalty, where there was a penalty because more than
nine nonserious violations were cited.
54
1-B
Nonserious (Other than Serious) Violations
Penalties of up to $1000 per violation may be imposed for each viola-
tion adjudged not to be of a serious nature.55 Discussion below informs
that a de minimus violation has no direct or immediate relationship to
safety or health. A "serious" violation is reported as a condition in
which there is a possibility of an accident a substantially probable result
of which is death or serious physical injury. In contrast, "nonserious"
violations are not defined by statute, and have not been defined by the
Review Board or North Carolina courts.
The compliance officer decides to recommend that a citation be classi-
fied serious or nonserious on the basis of guidelines in his or her Opera-
tions Manual. If the violative condition or practice would not most
predictably yield serious injury or death, it would be classified as "other"
than serious (nonserious).56 But the Review Board is not bound by the
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(a) (1985).
51. Notices of contest may only be filed to challenge citations, including alleged violations,
abatement dates and penalties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-129(5), 95-137(b) (1985).
52. Brooks v. Milliken & Co., Inc., 1 NCOSHD 1033 (1984). The notice of contest was appro-
priately withdrawn after the nonserious violation was reduced to de minimus.
53. See for example, Brooks v. Onslow County Economic Dev. Comm'n. 1 NCOSHD 1110
(1983), rev'd on point, 2 NCOSHD 522 (RB 1984), where a citation for a nonserious violation of a
standard requiring hot or tepid running water was considered "at most a de minimis violation," and
was vacated. See also Brooks v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection Co., 2 NCOSHD 1137 (1987), where a
citation for a nonserious violation of a standard regarding crane inspection records was reduced to
de minimus.
54. Brooks v. Lancer, Inc., 1 NCOSHD 329 (1978). All but two of the employer's exits were
marked with exit signs. See M. Smith, OSHA Law in North Carolina Chapter 7 (1985; and Supp.
1988) for more information about the assessment of penalties for more than nine nonserious
violations.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985).
56. See generally Operations Manual, Ch. VII B-l, and B-2, and specifically, Ch. VII B-I-c-
Step(3) (hereinafter, cited for example, O.M. Ch. VII B-i). The Operations Manual, frequently re-
ferred to as the "Field Operations Manual," is a book of instructions for compliance personnel
within the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina Department of Labor and is
a public document. Injuries resulting in permanent, prolonged or temporary impairments of the
body, and illnesses which could shorten life or significantly reduce physical or mental efficiency
would be "serious."
7
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Operations Manual.57
Citations for nonserious violations, per se, are not frequently at issue
before the appellate level of the Review Board. However, particular ele-
ments of the Commissioner's burden of proof with respect to nonserious
violations have emerged from the Board's decisions.
Beyond prima facie evidence of the actual existence of the alleged con-
dition, and applicability of the standard cited, there must be proof of
employee access or exposure to the condition. 8 There must also be
proof of employer knowledge of the condition.59
However, proof that the cited condition created the possibility of an
accident has not been required to sustain a citation for a nonserious vio-
lation. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a nonserious
violation was shown by the Commissioner, though the possibility of an
accident was not established.' Congruently, the Review Board has re-
duced serious citations and affirmed them as nonserious where the record
did not establish the possibility of an accident.6" Likewise, the Board has
restored citations to their classification as serious where the record did
show proof of the possibility of an accident.62
Consistent with the rationale upon which nonserious citation is
founded, if there is no proof of the likelihood of a condition resulting in
serious injury or death, the citation will be affirmed as nonserious, 63 or
reduced to nonserious. 64
1-C
Serious Violations
The Act states that the Commissioner shall assess a penalty of up to
$1000 for each "serious" violation.65 Compliance officers may also group
violations considered independently as nonserious into a single serious
violation.
66
57. Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp. 2 NCOSHD 277, 281 (RB 1981). The manual "has
neither the force nor effect of law... [and] does not and cannot vary rules of law applicable with a
reference to the burden of proof."
58. Brooks v. George W. Kane, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 79 (RB 1977).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 213-22.
60. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24
(1981). Not requiring proof of the possibility of an accident to sustain a citation for a nonserious
violation appears anomolous in that a citation for a nonserious violation assumes that the condition
will yield an injury or illness, though of lesser gravity than a serious violation.
61. Brooks v. Snow Hill Metalcraft Corp., 2 NCOSHD 377 (RB 1983).
62. Id.
63. Brooks v. Miller Brewing Co., 2 NCOSHD 365 (RB 1982).
64. Brooks v. Mechanical Specialty Co., 2 NCOSHD 317 (RB 1981).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985).
66. O.M. Ch. VII B-2-b; O.M. Ch. IX C-l-b. The practice of grouping nonserious violations
into a serious violation was accepted by the hearing examiner in Brooks v. Rose's Stores, Inc. # 360,
2 NCOSHD 1227 (1988).
8
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A serious violation is defined by statute.
A "serious violation" shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if
there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm
could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more prac-
tices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted
or are in use in such place of employment, unless the employer did not
know, and could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of
jhe presence of the violation.67 ;
Proving a Serious Violation
The North Carolina Supreme Court has considered the Act's defini-
tion of a serious violation, and held that to establish a serious violation,
"the Commissioner must show by substantial evidence, see G.S. 150A-
51(5), that the violation created apossibility of an accident a substantially
probable result of which was death or serious physical injury."6
Possibility of an Accident
Evidence of the existence of a condition does not establish the possibil-
ity of an accident.6 9 There must be substantial evidence, in the form of
data or opinion that the condition created the possibility of an accident.7"
Administrative notice of the dangers inherent in a particular condition
cannot compensate for a lack of proof of the possibility of an accident.7
Competent opinion testimony from the compliance officer is frequently
accepted as evidence of the possibility of an accident.72
It is incorrect to construe the Act's definition of a serious violation as
requiring proof of the "substantial probability" of the occurrence of an
accident.73 However, the remote probability of an accident may be justi-
fication for reducing a penalty.74
The language of particular standards has formerly been construed to
require more than proof of the possibility of an accident. Citations for
alleged violations of 29 C.F.R. 1910.133(a)(1) (1988) have been vacated
for lack of proof that employees not wearing eye protection were exposed
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(18) (1985).
68. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 115, 128, 303 N.C. 573, 585-86, 281 S.E.2d
24, 32 (1981).
69. Brooks v. Utility Constr. Co. of Charlotte, 2 NCOSHD 481 (RB 1983). Previously, the
Board had accepted the thesis that the possibility of an accident had been contemplated within the
standard-promulgation process.
70. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24
(1981).
71. Brooks v. L. P. Cox Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 331 (RB 1982).
72. See, e.g., Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 237, (RB 1984).
73. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 127, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d
24 (1981). Requiring proof of the probability of an accident would encourage employers to guess at
whether an accident might occur while deciding if a standard should be followed.
74. Brooks v. Croft Metals, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 441 (RB 1984).
9
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to a "reasonable probability of injury."75However, recent decisions re-
quired no more than proof of the possibility of an accident, notwithstand-
ing the language of standards.76
Death or Serious Physical Harm
The violative condition must have created the possibility of an accident
a substantially probable result of which was death or serious physical in-
jury. If a violative condition is shown but there is a lack of proof of the
substantial probability of serious injury, the citation may be reduced to
and affirmed as nonserious."
The requirement of proof of the probability of serious physical harm
from the chronic exposure of employees to toxic substances has not been
specifically decided. To date, citations for such conditions have been va-
cated because the testing methods were unrefined.7 8
That serious injury may result from a discrete occurrence may be so
obvious from the condition that, seemingly, administrative notice would
be sufficient. The Review Board has observed that if there must be evi-
dence to prove the possibility of an accident, there should also be evi-
dence to establish that the accident would yield serious injury.7 9
The medium for the evidence is frequently the compliance officer's or
other OSHA official's opinion testimony.80 Testimony is also accepted
from the respondent's employees about their prior injuries from similar
situations.81 The injury which resulted in the case before the Board may
also provide evidence. For example, "the fact that an activity in question
actually caused one death constitutes at least prima facie evidence of like-
75. Brooks v. Caravan, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 216, 219 (RB 1979). Personal protective equipment
is required by 29 C.F.R. 1910.133(a)(1) (1988) if there is a "reasonable probability of injury" which
such equipment would prevent. C.F.R. refers to Code of Federal Regulations, which is a codification
of rules and standards of federal executive departments, such as the U.S. Department of Labor.
Each item that appears in the C.F.R. was published in the Federal Register.
76. See Brooks v. Croft Metals, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 441 (RB 1984). The standard involved was
29 C.F.R. 1910.133(a)(1) (1988). And, in particular, see the Review Board's discussion in Brooks v.
McDevitt & Street Co., 2 NCOSHD 1032, 1037, 1039-40 (RB 1987).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
78. See, for example, Creel v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 2 NCOSHD 13 (RB 1976), aff'd, 2
NCOSHD 19, Docket No. 76 CVS 4671 (Superior Ct. 1978), where a citation for exposing employ-
ees to excess levels of coal tar pitch volatiles was vacated. See also Brooks v. William T. Burnett and
Co., 2 NCOSHD 155 (RB 1985) and 2 NCOSHD 164 (1986) where a citation for exposing employ-
ees to excess levels of "cotton dust 'raw' " was vacated. Given the nascent stage of knowledge about
safe exposure levels, the unspohisticated testing methods, and the fact that disease may result only
after chronic exposure to substances, requiring proof of the probability of serious injury would pose a
heavey burden.
79. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 237, (RB 1984).
80. Id.
81. Brooks v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 432 at 439 (RB 1984). The
employee had fallen eleven times, occasioning torn ligaments, paralysis, and a blood clot on his
brain.
10
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lihood" of serious physical injury. 82
The gravity of the expected or actual injury is assessed on an ad hoc
basis. The court of appeals has held that a "mutilated or amputated
foot" from the failure to wear safety shoes would constitute serious in-
jury. 83 The Review Board has reasoned that the loss of a finger to the die
of a press,84 and to an unguarded saw85 would be serious injury. How-
ever, whether a laceration would be serious would depend upon the




The Commissioner must establish that there was exposure of an em-
ployee to the alleged violation. Since the Act requires employers to com-
ply with standards to protect their employees,87 it is exposure of the
employee of the employer, proper, which must be established.88
While most exposures of employees are to discrete violative conditions
such as fall hazards, employees may also be exposed to continuous condi-
tions. Exposure to excess noise is an example of the latter type of condi-
tion. For proof of exposure to continuous conditions, the Review Board
accepts time-weighted averages obtained from sample monitoring then
extrapolated to an eight-hour period.89 Standards regarding continuous
conditions establish "permissible exposure limits" against which repre-
sentative samples may be compared.
The hearing examiner must set forth in the order, the evidence relied
upon to establish employee exposure.90 Frequently, evidence of em-
ployee exposure is established by testimony from the employer's own em-
ployees. Photographs taken by the compliance officer are evidence of
employee exposure.91 Testimony of the compliance officer about his ob-
servations may also be competent evidence regarding employee exposure.
It is not necessary that the compliance officer actually observe em-
ployee exposure.9 2 Yet, the evidence must be substantive. For example,
82. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 467, 372
S.E.2d 342, 347 (1988).
• 83. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 311, 317, 73 N.C. App. 426, 432, 326 S.E.2d
339, 342-43 (1985). Objects carried by the employees varied in weight from 25-350 pounds. The
court rejected the employer's argument that its absence of foot injuries forestalled the need for the
safety shoes.
84. Brooks v. Snow Hill Metalcraft Corp., 2 NCOSHD 377 (RB 1983).
85. Brooks v. Sunward Yacht Corp., 2 NCOSHD 266 (RB 1980).
86. Id. at 268.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(l)-(2) (1985).
88. Brooks v. Hughes Roofing Services, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 1181 (1987).
89. Brooks v. Cool Springs Lumber Co., 2 NCOSHD 848 (RB 1987).
90. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 260 (RB 1980).
91. Brooks v. Steel & Tank Service Co., 1 NCOSHD 632 (1981).
92. Brooks v. Biggers Brothers, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 183 (RB 1980), rev'd., 2 NCOSHD 188 (Su-
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the compliance officer's mere review of the employer's injury and illness
records is not probative.93 Similarly, an employee injury might or might
not be pertinent.
94
Proof of employee exposure does not necessarily mean that there was
actual exposure, as long as an employee had access to the hazard. "The
issue is whether employees in the course of their work, while on the job,
or going from work are reasonably likely to be in the immediate zone of
danger." 95
The test used by the Review Board to determine whether employees
had access to the immediate zone of danger is the "reasonable foresee-
ability" standard. The Commissioner must prove that the employee was
"reasonably likely to be exposed to the cited hazards." 96
Thus, employees within three feet of the edge of a flat roof were ex-
posed to the "zone of danger," whereas employees who never went closer
than ten feet to the edge would not have been exposed.97 Likewise, em-
ployees on the ground within six feet of a scaffold, and employees who
descended the scaffold, were in the zone of danger of objects falling from
the scaffold. 98
Proof of employee exposure to a condition cited as serious does not,
per se, establish the serious citation. For example, the Review Board has
explained that an unguarded power transmission apparatus may pose a
serious hazard to an exposed employee. Or, further examination of the
evidence may reveal that the exposure was necessitated by maintenance
requirements.99
Technically, any employee exposure to a condition in contravention of
an OSHA standard is a violation. However, brief employee exposure
may be required to abate a hazard, following an accident. °° A wide
variety of other demurrers and defenses are available to rebut the Com-
missioner's prima facie proof of employee exposure. 10'
Employer Knowledge
The Act requires the Commissioner to prove employer knowledge of
perior Ct. 1984). The court failed to set forth reasons for the reversal. However, the lower decision
makes clear that the reversal issued from the applicability of the standard, rather than a lack of
evidence of employee exposure.
93. Brooks v. Quality Embroidery, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 87-1368 (RB 1988).
94. Brooks v. Robbinsville Contracting, 2 NCOSHD 202 (RB 1979).
95. Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp., 2 NCOSHD 277, 277-78 (RB 1981).
96. Brooks v. Budd-Piper Roofing Co., 2 NCOSHD 323, 327 (RB 1983).
97. Brooks v. E. L. Scott Roofing Co., 2 NCOSHD 208 (RB 1979).
98. Brooks v. Andrew Hanes & Co., 2 NCOSHD 288 (RB 1980).
99. Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp., 2 NCOSHD 277 (RB 1981).
100. Brooks v. McDevitt & Street Co., I NCOSHD 1209 (1985).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 259-331. Also, see M. Smith, OSHA Law in North Caro-
lina Chapter 5 (1985; and Supp. 1988).
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the condition, in order to establish a violation alleged as serious. 10 2
Feasibility
The purpose of the Act imports that a citation will not be affirmed
unless there is evidence that the abatement performance required by the
standard is feasible. Workers are to be assured safe and healthful work-
ing conditions "so far as possible."10 3
If the standard involved in the citation was promulgated by federal-
OSHA and adopted by NC-OSHA, o then the feasibility of the standard
would have been a concern at the federal level." °5 If the standard was
promulgated by the Commissioner, feasibility would have been consid-
ered and, to the extent practical, the standard would be expressed in
"terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired."10 6
Technological Feasibility
If the promulgation process has addressed the feasibility of a specific
standard, the Review Board has not required the Commissioner to estab-
lish feasibility in order to prove a violation.'0 7 Further, employers are
free to decide the most efficient and cost-effective way to abate a condi-
tion if a standard specifies what to do but not how it must be done.'1 8
Generally-phrased standards, 10 9 and the General Duty Clause" 0 pro-
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(18) (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
103. Id. at § 95-126(b)(2).
104. See id. at § 95-131(a) empowering the Commissioner to adopt federal-OSHA standards.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970) requires the U.S. Secretary of Labor to determine that a new
standard is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe or healthful employment. 29
U.S.C. § 655(6)(5) (1970) also requires a consideration of "feasibility of the standards" and, "when-
ever practicable," expression of the standard in "objective criteria and of the performance desired."
However, federal case law has not settled the issue of whether § 6(b)(5) is limited to standards
regarding toxic, or durational hazards. Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193 (1981), Em-
ployment Safety and Health Guide (CCH) § 6491 requires federal-OSHA to subject new standards
to a cost-benefit analysis. Federal case law has excluded toxic, or durational standards from this
requirement. See American Textile Mfrs., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-131(d)(1) (1985).
107. Nye v. Mitchell Eng. Co., 2 NCOSHD 23 (RB 1976). The burden would properly be upon
the employer to prove that abatement is not "possible." See infra text accompanying notes 259-331
for information on the "impossibility of compliance" defense.
108. Brooks v. Custom Indus., 2 NCOSHD 89 (RB 1977).
109. Two of the most fequently cited generally-phrased standards are 29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a)
(1988), and 39 C.F.R. 1910.132(a) (1988):
29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a) - The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of appropriate
personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous condi-
tions or where this part indicates the need for using such equipment to reduce the hazards to the
employees.
29 C.F.R. 1910.132(a) - Protective equipment, including personal protective equipment for eyes,
face, head and extremities, protective clothing, respiratory devices, and protective shields and barri-
ers, shall be provided, used, and maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever it is neces-
sary by reason of hazards of processes or environment, chemical hazards, or mechanical irritants
encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function of any part of the
body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact.
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vide scant abatement direction beyond the requirement to correct partic-
ular hazards. Thus, for these requirements, the Review Board has held
that fair play (due process) requires the Commissioner to demonstrate
that abatement means are both "practical and available." 11'
Evidence that a crane could have been employed for an additional two
minutes to set a concrete form was proof that an abatement means was
practical and available, to sustain a citation for violation of the General
Duty Clause.'1 2 Steel pipes extending through a roof were a practical
and available means for securing lifelines.'I 3 Likewise, an air condition-
ing unit was an available and practical anchor for lifelines, though roof
vent pipes were not.1
1 4
The abatement of a condition may require that the employer use tech-
nology beyond that in use within its industry.' 5 That is, industry custom
and practice are not controlling; nor is it a defense that other companies
are not in compliance. Conversely, technology which employers within
an industry are able to afford does not necessarily dictate alternative
abatement means to be used by a less wealthy employer in the
industry. "16
If new technology is required, the complainant may have to show that
the technology is available. To require the development of new technol-
ogy until the complainant is satisfied may pose an intolerable economic
burden for the employer." 7 Similarly, abatement may be economically
prohibitive unless the Commissioner can show the cause of a condi-
tion.'II Technological and economic feasibility may be inextricably
intertwined.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 126-51.
111. Nye v. Mitchell Eng. Co., 2 NCOSHD 23 (RB 1976).
112. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
113. Brooks v. Trout & Riggs Constr. Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 395 (RB 1982). The standard was
29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a) (1988). It was of no consequence that holes would have had to be drilled
through the pipes. Inconvenience is no defense. The holes could be closed by welding.
114. Brooks v. Bonitz Insulation Co., 2 NCOSHD 350 (RB 1985). The hearing examiner must
consider each abatement means suggested by the Commissioner.
115. Nye v. Stewart Warner Corp., 2 NCOSHD 46 (RB 1976). The standard involved, 29
C.F.R. 1910.95(b)(1), requires the use of "feasible" administrative or engineering controls, but like
other generally-phrased standards, does not provide abatement direction.
116. Brooks v. Cool Springs Lumber Co., 2 NCOSHD 848 (RB 1987). The standard was 29
C.F.R. 1910.95(b)(1).
117. Brooks v. Quality Emproidery, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 87-1368 (RB 1988). The
standard (29 C.F.R. 1910.212(a)(3)(ii) (1988)) is generally-phrased and requires the guarding of
"points of operation" on numerous types of machinery where a hazard is presented to employees.
The complainant failed to show that guards were available anywhere in the United States, or that the
machines could be guarded.
118. Brooks v. Cole Mfg. Co., 2 NCOSHD 213 (RB 1979). The citation was for an alleged
violation of the General Duty Clause.
14




The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal-OSH Act
to proscribe cost-benefit analyses for health standards. 1 9 The Review
Board is reluctant to engage in ad hoc cost-benefit analyses regarding the
abatement of conditions. 20
Nonetheless, for particular citations, demonstrating the economic fea-
sibility of abating a condition is part of the burden of proving feasibility.
However, once the Commissioner demonstrates that abatement means
are available and practical, successful rebuttal requires proof of "severe
economic consequences" from compliance. 2' Proof of severe economic
consequences means demonstrating that compliance costs cannot be ab-
sorbed and that the cost of compliance cannot be passed on as a neces-
sary expense.1
22
The Commissioner has sustained his burden of demonstrating that it
was economically feasible to require that chemical splash-proof goggles
be provided; 2  that employees be supplied safety-shoes; 2 4 and that a
crane be provided to set each concrete form, at an extra cost of two dol-
lars per form. 25
1-D
General Duty Clause (GDC) Violations
In addition to the duty to comply with OSHA standards or regula-
tions, 12 6 each employer is charged with a more general duty:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees conditions of em-
ployment and a place of employment free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious injury or serious physi-
119. See supra text accompaning notes 103-06. There is a noteworthy difference between the
federal-OSH and NC-OSH Acts respecting the promulgation of standards for "toxic materials or
harmful physical agents" (health as opposed to safety standards). The former requires the develop-
ment of the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent "feasible," the health of employ-
ees; whereas, the latter uses the word, "possible." The distinction is significant. Feasible carries the
understanding that a proposition is achievable, whereas possible means that given certain conditions,
a proposal could be achieved. Contrast P.L. 91-596 § 6(b)(5) 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970 & Supp. IV
1986 & Supp. V 1987), with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-131(d)(1) (1985). Nothing prevents NC-OSHA
from enforcing standards which are more stringent than those of federal-OSHA.
120. Brooks v. Salem Coatings, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 84, 88 (RB 1977). "Balancing the potential
injury against the cost of eliminating it is a dangerous exercise; however, here the gravity is so
serious and the cost so minimal that the result is clear that the hazard must be eliminated."
121. Brooks v. Raleigh Tractor & Truck Co., 2 NCOSHD 445, 449 (RB 1983).
122. See Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 460, 469 (RB 1983) for perti-
nent dicta.
123. Brooks v. Salem Coatings, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 84 (RB 1977).
124. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 299, 326 (RB 1981), aff'd., 2 NCOSHD 311, 73
N.C. App. 426, 326 S.E.2d 339 (1985).
125. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(2) (1985).
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cal harm to his employees. 127;
The purpose of the GDC is to protect employees in situations where the
need for a standard has not been anticipated.
The GDC does not substitute for the standard promulgation process.
Wherever possible, standards include the performance required. for com-
pliance. Thus, due process dictates against citation under the GDC
where a specific standard applies to the "four corners" of the subject of
the citation.
1 28
If the Commissioner fails to cite a standard which may be seen as ap-
plicable, citation under the GDC is not thereby automatically voided.
The burden is on the employer to show that a standard applies and that
there was compliance. 129 However, "the failure of the Commissioner to
establish a specific safety regulation for hazards does not relieve the em-
ployer from its general obligation to provide employees 'conditions of
employment . . . free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious injury or serious physical harm.' "130
It may not be possible to know with certainty that a standard applies
to a particular circumstance. Thus, the Commissioner is allowed to cite
(or to amend the pleadings to cite) a standard as an alternative to the
GDC (or vice versa).'3
Citations under the GDC are issued only to the employer whose own
employees are exposed to the hazard. t3 2 The Act requires each employer
to furnish to his employees protection from hazards likely to injure his
employees. 133
The GDC is only cited for "serious" violations.' 34 The Act limits the
GDC to hazards which are causing or are likely to cause serious physical
harm or death.
1 35
Proving a Violation of the GDC
To prove that the employer violated the GDC, the "complainant must
show that an employer failed to render its workplace free of a hazard
which was 'recognized' and causing or likely to cause death or serious
127. Id. at § 95-129(1) (1985).
128. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 3 NCOSHD -, - N.C. App.-, 379 S.E.2d 707 (1989).
129. Brooks v. Fruehauf Corp., 2 NCOSHD 271 (RB 1981).
130. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 3 NCOSHD , N.C. App. -, 379 S.E.2d 707, 710
(1989).
131. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 577 (1985). The hearing examiner found that the
standard was not applicable; however, citation under the GDC remained.
132. O.M. Ch. IX F-2-g.
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(1) (1985).
134. O.M. Ch. X C-5-c; O.M. Ch. VII A-2-d.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(1) (1985).
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physical harm."' 3 6 Additionally, the Commissioner must demonstrate




The employer has the affirmative obligation to render its workplace
free of a hazard. Still, "Congress, by the absolute terms of the 'general
duty clause,' did not intend to impose strict liability upon employers.
Only preventable hazards must be eliminated."' 38
In Brooks v. Cole Manufacturing Company,1 39 the majority view was
that the employer had not failed to perform its duty because its practices
and procedures were limited to those recognized by its industry. The
dissenting opinion was that regardless of whether the practices were stan-
dard in the industry, the employer should have been able to foresee the
emerging hazard; thus, the hazard was preventable.
Because the duty imposed by the GDC upon employers is general, the
Review Board will scrutinize the employer's safety program. In particu-
lar, the Board is interested in whether any safety rule or policy specifi-
cally, and effectively, addressed the hazard at issue."' °
Its Workplace
The workplace contemplates both "conditions of employment" and "a
place of employment."' 4 t Conditions of employment include the prac-
tices and procedures which the employees follow.' 4 2 A place of employ-
ment is wherever the employees' duty takes them. 143
Free of a Hazard Which was Recognized
The Commissioner must establish that the hazard was "recognized,"
and in deciding that, the Board may employ the "reasonable man"
test. 144 It must also be established that the employer was aware that the
136. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
137. Id.
138. Id. at -, 91 N.C. App. at 464, 372 S.E.2d at 345.
139. 2 NCOSHD 213 (RB 1979). The company kept the furnace in operation, despite warnings
from its maintenance superintendent who was also the most experienced furnace operator, and de-
spite a history of difficulty on the day of the accident. Ultimately, the furnace erupted molten metal
upon employees.
140. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 584 (RB 1985).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(2) (1985).
142. Brooks v. Raleigh City Coach Lines, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 705 (1985). The employees fol-
lowed the practice of working beneath buses upon hydraulic lifts which did not have operable auto-
matic locking devices.
143. Such as remote logging areas, Brooks v. Ted Pack Logging Co., 1 NCOSHD 248 (1978); or
multi-employer worksites, Brooks v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 1 NCOSHD 431 (1979).
144. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
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conduct or condition existed in its employee's workplace.145
Causing or Likely to Cause
The cases do not suggest that the Commissioner's burden regarding
this element is any more stringent than that required in order to prove
any other serious violation. That is, the Commissioner must present sub-
stantial evidence that the subject of the citation created the possibility of
an accident.146 Because the citation involves a general duty, however,
the Review Board will closely attend to the quality of the evidence. 147
There is no requirement that an accident or injury be involved.
Rather, the Commissioner is only required to prove that the hazard is
likely to cause serious injury or death. Therefore, an accident and injury
of unknown origin may exist along side of the cited hazard without the
need to show a causal nexus between them. 148
Death or Serious Physical Harm
As with any other citation for an alleged serious violation, there must
be evidence to show that death or serious physical harm would be the
substantially probable result of an accident which was possible to occur
because of the hazard. 149
Feasibility of Abatement
The demonstration of a feasible means to abate the hazard is necessary
to ensure due process where a requirement does not address that matter.
Proving feasibility of abatement is linked to establishing that the condi-
tion was "recognized." 15 In order to show how a condition could be




A penalty of up to $10,000 per occurrence may be assessed by the
Commissioner upon an employer for "repeated" violations.15 2 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has written, "we think the purpose be-
145. See infra text accompanying notes 223-37.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.
147. See, e.g., Brooks v. Metrolina Greenhouses, Inc., 1 NCOSHD 284 (1978), aff'd, 2
NCOSHD 171 (RB 1978). The citation was vacated because the compliance officer's testimony
about the condition was vague and uncertain.
148. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 2 NCOSHD 891 (RB 1986).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
150. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD-, OSHANC 83-1039,91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
151. Brooks v. Cole Mfg. Co., 2 NCOSHD 213 (RB 1979).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985).
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hind the much greater fine for repeated violations is to punish an em-
ployer for failure to comply with a standard about which, because of
prior violations, he should be cognizant."'
' 53
A citation for a repeated violation may characterize the violation as
serious, or nonserious.154 Also, the repeated denomination is determined
by the fact of the prior violation, rather than by whether the previous
violation was serious or nonserious. For example, a repeated-serious vio-
lation may be founded upon a previous nonserious violation.' 55 Simi-
larly, a repeated-nonserious violation may be based upon a prior
nonserious violation.
15 6
A violation of a safety standard will not be described as repeated if the
prior violation was nonserious and occurred more than two years previ-
ous, or was serious and occurred more than three years previous. No
maximum time limit is considered if the prior violation was serious and
involved a health standard.'
If a violation can be described as repeated and "willful," it will be cited
as willful.'5 8 In addition to violations of standards and other regulations,
violations of the General Duty Clause may also be cited as repeated.' 59
A violation is properly classified as repeated if the prior violation was
abated. If the subject of the prior citation was not abated, discovery of
the unabated condition would prompt a "failure to correct" notice."6
However, the Review Board may amend the pleadings to conform to the
evidence, especially if the proper citation were tried and proven, without
objection.
1 6 1
Proving a Repeated Violation
A "repeated" violation is not defined by the Act. In interpreting the
word "repeated," the Supreme Court of North Carolina said: "We hold
that a subsequent violation by the same employer substantially similar to
a prior violation or violations is a repeated violation only if the employer
should have known of the standard by virtue of the prior citation or
citations." 
162
153. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 130, 303 N.C. 573, 588, 281
S.E.2d 24, 33 (1981).
154. Brooks v. Baker Cammack Hosiery Mills, 2 NCOSHD 94 (RB 1977).
155. Brooks v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, 1 NCOSHD 885 (1982).
156. Brooks v. Weldon Roofing & Sheetmetal, Inc., 1 NCOSHD 961 (1982).
157. O.M. Ch. VII B-4-a.
158. O.M. Ch. VII B-4-c. See infra text accompanying notes 177-87.
159. O.M. Ch. X C-5-c. Being a violation of the General Duty Clause, it would also be serious.
'160. O.M. Ch. VII B-4-d.
161. Brooks v. Pelkey Wood Products Co., 2 NCOSHD 169 (RB 1978).
162. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 132, 303 N.C. 573, 590, 281
S.E.2d 24, 34 (1981).
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Subsequent Violation
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the notion that before a
citation can allege a repeated violation there must be more than one prior
similar violation. Rather, the court held that a second violation could be
characterized as repeated. 63
The words "subsequent violation" logically convey the existence of a
prior violation. However, a hearing examiner has affirmed a citation as
repeated without deciding whether there was a prior violation. The re-
peated charge was affirmed on the strength of the prior citation, which
had imparted knowledge of the subject standard.64
A settlement agreement has been accepted as a basis for a repeated
citation. 165
Same Employer
For "fixed establishments" like factories or stores, the Commissioner's
regulations limit consideration for repeated citations to the history of the
cited establishment. For construction, excavation, and similar businesses
which work at changing sites, repeated citations are founded upon a
prior violation within the state's boundaries.
166
The same employer does not mean that the supervisor during the con-
dition alleged as repeated must be the same as during the prior viola-
tion. 167 An employer is the same, for purposes of a repeated citation,
despite a change in the name of the business, 168 and despite the fact that
the business may close then reopen a year later in a new location. 6 9
Substantially Similar to a Prior Violation
The previous and subsequent violations must be of the same stan-
dard.' 71 However, the violations may be of different substandards within
163. Id.
164. Brooks v. Capital Lightning Protection Co., I NCOSHD 817 (1981). The Commissioner's
regulations (O.M. Ch. IV G-l-b-(2)) treat a citation as final when the contest period has expired
though a notice of contest issued but was limited to the penalty. The Board has not addressed that
point, and the Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-137(b) (1) (1985) is not clear. What is clear is that penalties
stem from and are effected by alleged violations, that employers frequently represent themselves in
OSHANC proceedings, and that pleadings can be very confusing.
165. Brooks v. Center of Textiles Suplies, Inc., I NCOSHD 202 (1977).
166. O.M. Ch. VII B-4-f. The probable logic for the different standard is that non-fixed busi-
nesses should not be allowed to commit one violation at each site before being cited for a repeated
violation.
167. See the hearing examiner's discussion at Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 859 (1987).
However, differences in supervision in combination with other factors may affect the employer's
knowledge. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24
(1981).
168. Brooks v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, 1 NCOSHD 885 (1982).
169. Brooks v. Center of Textiles Supplies, Inc., 1 NCOSHD 202 (1977). The citation was va-
cated on other grounds.
170. Brooks v. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, 2 NCOSHD 94 (RB 1977).
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the standard.171 The essential question is whether the conditions sur-
rounding the prior and subsequent violations were similar enough that
the employer would know that the same standard was being violated
again.
A hearing examiner has held that a missing midrail around an elevator
shaft would not have notified the employer that uncovered floor holes
would violate the same standard. 172 Likewise, the failure to erect guard-
rails around a six-foot-high platform was not sufficient notice that an
unguarded section of the twentieth floor of a building would violate the
same standard.
173
Conditions cited in the prior and subsequent citations may be in differ-
ent locations within the same fixed establishment, and the subjects of the
citations may differ. For example, different machinery in various loca-
tions within a manufacturing concern may be the subject of a repeated
citation. 174
If the Employer Should Have Known of the Standard by Virtue of the
Prior Citation
Factors set by the Review Board were adopted by the court, to deter-
mine whether the employer should have known of the standard. Those
factors were "the extent to which the condition was obviously unsafe, the
proximity in time to the prior citation, whether management or key em-
ployees had changed between citations, and the number of prior substan-
*tially similar violations."'
' 75
Normally, proof of a prior citation is in the form of documentation
drawn from OSHANC files and proffered by the compliance officer.
However, a compliance officer's testimony, unsubstantiated by documen-





The history of the Act suggests that, initially, penalties for "willful"
violations were only to be imposed as criminal sanctions. 77 Conviction
for the willful violation of the Act's provisions, which results in an em-
171. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24 (1981).
172. Brooks v. Ceco Corp., I NCOSHD 915 (1984).
173. Brooks v. McDevitt & Street Co., 1 NCOSHD 1209 (1985).
174. Brooks v. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, 1 NCOSHD 193 (1977), 2 NCOSHD 94 (RB
1977).
175. Brooks v McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 115, 132, 303 N.C. 573, 590, 281 S.E.2d 24,
34 (1981).
176. Brooks ';. McDevitt & Street Co., 3 NCOSH -, OSHANC 87-1347 (RB 1988).
177. Brooks v. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, 1 NCOSHD 193 (1977).
I 19
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ployee's death, does invoke criminal penalties. However, a provision was
added to impose civil penalties for willful violations which do not result
in the death of an employee.
17 8
A citation for a willful violation may be characterized as nonserious or
serious. 179 The citation may also allege a willful violation of a standard,
or the General Duty Clause. Though, in the latter instance, the violation
would be serious. The Commissioner's regulations provide for citation as
willful where there is evidence that the employer consciously violated the
Act, or though not conscious of the violation, knew of the condition and
made no attempt to eliminate it.18 °
Proving a Willful Violation
A willful violation is not defined by the Act. However, the Review
Board, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals have set forth elements
of proof which must be satisfied by the Commissioner, in order to prove a
willful violation. 181 The court has written that: "A violation is deemed
to be willful when there is shown 'a deliberate purpose not to discharge
some duty necessary to the safety of the person or property of
another.' "182
Deliberate Purpose
The Act's civil penalty provision speaks of "any employer who will-
fully or repeatedly violates the requirements of this Article . ,, . 3 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to equate willful and re-
peated violations in terms of employer conduct. Willful violations re-
quire a showing of greater culpability on the part of the employer.1
84
There is no requirement that the Commissioner prove that the em-
ployer acted out of "malice," in order to establish deliberate purpose.185
Rather, in the Review Board's leading opinion on willful violations, evi-
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-139 (1985) (criminal penalties); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-138 (1985)
(civil penalties).
179. Brooks v. Hobson Constr. Co., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 86-1268 (1988).
180. O.M. Ch. VII B-3-a.
181. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 237 (RB 1984). According to the Review
Board, "these elements are: (1) employer knowledge of the violative condition, (2) employer knowl-
edge of the standard, (3) a subsequent violation of the standard, and (4) the violation being commit-
ted voluntarily or with intentional disregard of the standard or with demonstrated plain indifference
of the Act." Id. at 239.
182. Brooks v. O.S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 529, 531, 84 N.C. App. 630, 632, 353 S.E.2d
869, 871 (1987) (quoting Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191, 148 S.E. 36, 37 (1929)).
183. "Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of this Article, any
standard, rule or order promulgated pursuant to this Article, may upon the recommendation of
the Director to the Commissioner be assessed by the Commissioner a civil penalty of not more
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each violation." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-138(a) (1985).
184. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24
(1981).
185. Brooks v. O.S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 237, 241 (RB 1984).
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dence of deliberate purpose included: (1) the fact of the prior violations
and the employer's knowledge of them; (2) the lack of an effective safety
program - there was no written safety program and safety instructions
were limited to impromptu comments, occasioned by employee acts; and
(3) the absence of discipline for employees who worked in violation of the
Act. 1
86
Not to Discharge Some Duty
The deliberate failure to discharge a duty imposed by law suggests the
presence of employer knowledge of the condition, and (arguably) of the
legal requirement. The Review Board requires the Commissioner to
prove employer knowledge of the condition and standard. 187
1-G
Failure to Correct Notices
The Act states that "a citation shall fix a reasonable time for the abate-
ment of the violation." '88 If within fifteen working days of receipt of the
citation the employer fails to file a notice of contest, the citation and any
proposed penalty will be deemed final. 89 In that case, the condition
should have been corrected within the time period set by the citation.
If the employer does initiate any review proceedings before the Board,
the period during which the condition must be corrected will not begin to
run until the Board enters a final decision.' 9 ° An abatement period with
different limits may be set by the Board in its final decision.
If a follow-up inspection reveals that a condition was not corrected
during the period for abatement, the employer will be issued a "failure to
correct notice" and a proposal for additional penalties. "9 ' The penalty
may be up to $1000 per violation for each day the violation was not
corrected. 192 The employer may then file a notice of contest to challenge
the failure to correct notice and penalty proposal.'
93
Proving a Failure to Correct Notice
186. Id. at 242, aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 248, Docket No. 85 CVS 660 (Superior Ct. 1986).
187. If the citation were for the willful violation of the General Duty Clause, the complainant's
burden would logically be limited to establishing employer knowledge of the condition.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(a) (1985).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(1) (1985).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(2) (1985). The Act does not contain a similar provision for
automatic stay pending judicial review. See id. at § 95-141.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(2) (1985). If the abatement period expires prior to expiration
of the period for contesting, a failure to correct notice will not issue until after the contest period has
elapsed. See O.M. Ch. X C-7-d.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138 (1985). The penalty is calculated for the number of "working
days" the violation was not abated. Normally, a 10-day limit is observed (O.M. Ch. X C-7-d).
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(2) (1985).
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A hearing examiner has integrated from various NC-OSHA decisions,
the elements of proof required to establish a notice for failure to correct.
The complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) an inspection occurred and a citation issued; (2) an abatement period
extension was not granted; (3) the violation became final; (4) a follow-up
inspection took place; (5) the exact violation previously cited remained;
and, (6) the condition alleged not to have been abated was a violation
both at the time of the inspection and at the time of the follow-up
inspection. 94
An Inspection Occurred and a Citation Issued
Employer knowledge of the condition is normally established by docu-
mentary evidence of the original inspection and citation.'95 Such proof
substantiates that the subjects of the citation and failure to correct notice
are the same.
AN ABATEMENT PERIOD EXTENSION WAS NOT GRANTED
Logically, one cannot have failed to correct a condition by a certain
date if that same abatement deadline was later extended.
96
The Violation Became Final
If the citation was not contested, the period permitted in the citation
for the correction of the violation will determine whether the violation
was final. If the citation was challenged, the final Review Board order
will specify the abatement period.197 In either instance, proving that the
violation was final is the complainant's burden.
A Follow-up Inspection Took Place
The follow-up inspection must have been conducted in accordance
with governing statutes.198 If the follow-up inspection was defective, the
evidence garnered may be excluded. 99
The Exact Violation Previously Cited Remained
If the previous condition was abated then recurred, proper procedure
would be to cite a "repeated" violation. The distinction may be signifi-
cant because the penalties may be substantially higher for a failure to
correct notice. Also, unless the subject matter were tried without objec-
194. Brooks v. C and D Printing Co., 2 NCOSHD 689 (1984).
195. Brooks v. Raleigh Tractor & Truck Co., 2 NCOSHD 445 (RB 1983).
196. Brooks v. Gwinn Engineering Co., 1 NCOSHD 501 (1979).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(2) (1985). If the 15 working-day period for contesting elaped
and review proceedings were not invoked, the condition will be considered a final violation, by oper-
ation of the statute.
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-136 (1985) sets guidelines for all inspections.
199. Brooks v. D. C. Murray's Crane Service, I NCOSHD 774 (1981).
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tion as "repeated," '2°° the failure to correct notice will not be
sustained.20
The Condition Alleged not to Have Been Abated was a Violation Both at
the Time of the Inspection and at the Time of the Follow-up Inspection
The complainant must establish all of the elements of a violation for
the failure to correct condition.2 °2 Additionally, the employer may at-
tack the original condition as having been nonviolative.2 °3 An employer
may, for many reasons, choose not to contest, or to withdraw a notice of
contest prior to a hearing on the merits. Therefore, a citation may be-
come final due to expiration of the contest period or because of inability
to finance litigation.2° Yet, it may be that an actual violation was not
determined by litigation on the merits.20 5
2
Employer Knowledge - Burden of Proof - Citations, Notices
In order to prove an alleged violation of an OSHA standard, or provi-
sion under the Act, the Commissioner of Labor must establish the exist-
ence of employer knowledge of the condition.20 6 Particular citations also
require proof of employer knowledge of the standard, and/or proof of
employer knowledge that the condition violated the standard or other
provision. Citations may characterize violations in various ways, thus
invoking the need for proof of different elements of employer knowledge.
To illustrate, a citation may allege a willful violation of the General Duty
Clause.20 7 The quantum of proof is the preponderance of the
evidence.208
The direction of case law is away from the concept of "strict liability."
Employers are not always and in every instance responsible for the health
and safety of employees.
* Where there can be no "foreseeability" of a condition, such as in the
case of an unpreventable accident, there is not employer knowledge.
200. Brooks v. Pelkey Wood Products Co., 2 NCOSHD 169 (RB 1978).
201. Brooks v. Ava Indus. Inc., 1 NCOSHD 1173 (1984).
202. Brooks v. Caravan, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 216 (RB 1979).
203. Brooks v. Greensboro Industrial Platers, 1 NCOSHD 183 (1977).
204. See Brooks v. Baker Roofing Co., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 88-1532 (1989). The respon-
dent withdrew to avoid further litigation expenses.
205. Res judicada or collateral estoppel could preclude relitigating previously decided issues.
206. R.P. .0514(a).
207. This instance demands familiarity with requirements for proving employer knowledge for
"serious" violations (all General Duty Clause violations are alleged as serious), for "General Duty
Clause" violations (and possibly for violations of "generally-phrased standards") and for "willful"
violations.
208. See Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp., 2 NCOSHD 277 (RB 1981); Brooks v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 299 (RB 1981).
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• If the employer does satisfy reasonable expectations to ensure the health
and safety of its employees, it will not be held accountable for employee
misconduct. "Misconduct" of either a nonsupervisory or supervisory
employee may serve to exculpate the employer.
. "Hidden" conditions, and even conditions in plain view but requiring an
expert-eye to detect, may fail to convey employer knowledge. As one
example, subcontractor employers may rely upon the expertise of others
at multi-employer worksites for assurances regarding the absence of
hazards not apparent to the untrained eye.
. Proof of employer knowledge is required to sustain a citation for an
alleged violation, whether the citation is denominated "serious" or
"nonserious."
At two places the Act specifically addresses the subject of employer
knowledge, and at one place, the Act alludes to employer knowledge.
"Actual" and "constructive" employer knowledge are used by the Act in
its definition of a "serious violation." 2" Keeping conditions and places
of work free from "recognized hazards" is a duty assigned by the Act to
employers. 2 '0  Latitude to assign the severest monetary penalties is re-
served for employers who repeatedly or willfully violate the Act, and for
those who fail to correct a violation.21
2-A
Knowledge - Citations for Nonserious Violations
In 1985, the Review Board concluded that proof of employer knowl-
edge of the violative condition is required to sustain a citation denomi-
nated "nonserious." 2t2  Thus, "nonserious" violations require the same
proof of employer knowledge as do "serious" violations. Additionally,
citations for nonserious violations denominated "repeated" or "willful"
require other forms of proof.
2-B
Knowledge - Citations for Serious Violations
The requirement of proof of employer knowledge for a serious viola-
tion is set by the Act. A citation for a serious violation will not be sus-
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(18) (1985).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(1) (1985).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985). Repeated and willful acts, and "failure-to-correct"
omissions imply the existence of employer knowledge of the standard and of the condition.
212. Brooks v. L. P. Cox Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 637 (RB 1985), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 645, Docket
No. 85 CVS 9029 (Super. Ct. 1987). The Board faced the issue directly for the first time. The Act
does not define a nonserious violation. Thus, the Board concluded from the purpose of the Act that
the legislature had not intended to impose a strict liability standard upon employers. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 95-126(b)(2) (1985) states in pertinent part that the purpose of the Act is "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the State of North Carolina safe and healthful working
conditions .... "
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tained if the ". . . employer did not know, and could not, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the viola-
tion."2 '3 At issue is the employer's knowledge of the violative condition
or conduct, not of the standard or regulation.
Actual Knowledge - Admitted
The employer which has first hand knowledge of the violations, is said
to possess "actual" knowledge. If the employer acknowledges an aware-
ness of the violative condition then, generally, the Commissioner's bur-
den of proof is satisfied.21 4
Knowledge - Imputed through the Supervisor
Knowledge of the violative condition may be "imputed" to the em-
ployer through its supervisor. There is an agency relationship between
the employer and its "supervisor, working within the bounds of the au-
thority delegated to him by the employer .... ,,215 As the Board has
explained, failure to impute the supervisor's knowledge to the employer
would breach the agency relationship and may actually encourage em-
ployers to conduct work through unsupervised employees.2" 6
There are prerequisites to imputing knowledge to the employer. The
employee through which knowledge is to be imputed must be shown to
have been the employer's bona fide supervisor. The National Labor Re-
lations Act has been used as a criterion for determining supervisory
status.217
Also, the employer must have authorized its supervisory relationship.
The Board has held that knowledge could not be imputed to an employer
through a third person, where the supervisor had delegated his own su-
pervisory authority without informing the employer.218
Knowledge - Imputed through Constructive Circumstances
Demonstration of the presence of a violative condition is generally not
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127 (18) (1985).
214. Brooks v. Independent Testing Lab., 2 NCOSHD 222 (RB 1979). An appropriate demur-
rer to the admission of actual knowledge is the employer's proof of its lack of control of the work-
place and of its provision of effective alternative protection.
215. Brooks v. Schloss Outdoor Advertising Co., 2 NCOSHD 552 (RB 1985).
216. See id. at 564-66 for discussion and cases. However, see infra text accompanying notes for
discussion on extension of the. "isolated employee misconduct" defense to supervisors.
217. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 2 NCOSHD 904 (RB 1987). The lower order had imputed
knowledge to the employer but the Board found the "mechanic-in-charge" to be an ad hoc crew
leader, as opposed to a permanent supervisor. See Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 2 NCOSHD 894
(1986).
218. Brooks v. Acoustics, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 784 (RB 1986). To establish imputed knowledge,
the complainant would first have had to show that the employer sanctioned the sub-supervisory
arrangement.
27
Smith: Proving Violations or Proving Affirmative Defenses under the Occu
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1989
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
sufficient to prove that the employer knew of the condition.219 However,
particular conditions or events can impute knowledge of the alleged vio-
lation to the employer. Such imputation, known as "constructive knowl-
edge," results where the employer fails to exercise "reasonable diligence"
to know of the presence of the violation. Two examples are illustrative:
(a) constructive knowledge existed where the employer failed to enforce
safety rules to forestall a violative condition well known to it, as evi-
denced by numerous prior citations for the same condition;220 (b) con-
structive knowledge was found where the employer partially reimbursed
employees for purchasing equipment to protect against the condition
which it professed not to recognize as a hazard.
22'
"Reasonable diligence" in pursuit of employer knowledge of violations
has not been defined by the Board. The Board has, however, held that a
subcontractor exercised reasonable diligence when, at a multi-employer
worksite, it relied upon determinations of licensed professionals with spe-
cialized knowledge.222
2-C
Knowledge - Citations for Generally-phrased Standards
To sustain a citation for the alleged violation of a generally-phrased
standard, 223 there must be proof of: (a) employer knowledge of the con-
dition (or conduct); and (b) employer knowledge that the condition (or
conduct) was a hazard, as contemplated by the generally-phrased
standard.
Simply put, there must be evidence that the employer was or should
have been placed on notice by something, "as to either what conduct
would be required of him by this standard or what sort of condition it
219. Id. at 786.
220. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 237 (RB 1984), aff'd., 2 NCOSHD 529, 84
N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 869 (1987).
221. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD (RB 1981), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 311, 73 N.C.
App. 426, 326 S.E.2d 339 (1985). Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91
N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d 342 (1988), where the employer's efforts to stablize a concrete form to
prevent its falling were evidence that the employer recognized the hazard.
222. Brooks v. L. P. Cox Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 637 (RB 1985).
223. Two of the most frequently contested generally-phrased standards are: 29 C.F.R.
1926.28(a) (1988) and 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(a) (1988). For the wording of those standards, see supra
text accompanying notes 107-18.
Respondents have not been sucessful in claiming that generally-phrased standards are
"facially" vague. A hearing examiner has held that 29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a) (1988) is not so vague
on its face that it precludes employer knowledge (Brooks v. CFW Constr. Co., Inc., 2
NCOSHD 1063 (1987)); and the Review Board has held similarly for 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(a)
(1988). (Nye v. Peden Steel Co., 2 NCOSHD 37 (RB 1976)). It is not possible to develop
specific standards to apply to every conceivable condition or conduct. The Board recognizes the
legitimate role of generally-phrased standards, where specific standards cannot or have not been
promulgated.
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would apply to." '2 24
To illustrate, the Board has held that the Commissioner did not prove
that a particular employer could be expected to know that failing to pro-
vide a maintenance employee with rubber gloves for the purpose of
changing a fuse would violate the general standard involved.22 5
The preponderance of the evidence showed that in the "common un-
derstanding" of the employer's industry, rubber-insulated gloves are only
required where 600 volts of electricity are involved. "No maintenance
men anywhere commonly wear such gloves to change a fuse or perform
'electrical maintenance.' ",226
The "Reasonable Man" Test of Knowledge
Customs and practices within an employer's industry can, and do, af-
fect the Commissioner's ability to establish proof of employer knowledge
where generally-phrased standards are cited. However, in North Caro-
lina, the crucial question is whether a "reasonably prudent employer"
would have recognized the need for the protection, as required by the
generally-phrased standard.227
Where industry custom and practice are determinative of employer
knowledge, employees might be exposed to outmoded, or unsafe stan-
dards of safety.228 In addition, for any number of reasons, a particular
industry may simply fail to address a particular hazard. Therefore, em-
ployers are required to become acquainted with hazards regarding their
work, and with means of protecting their employees from the hazards,
notwithstanding their industry's practices.
Alleged violations are assessed on a case-by-case basis, with the indus-
try's customs and practices considered as but one of any number of fac-
tors. Examples of case-by-case assessments are:
(1) Where employees lifted objects from 25 to 350 pounds and carried
them thirty feet or more, it was "reasonably foreseeable" that safety
shoes were required to prevent foot injuries.2 29
(2) For employees who worked within 36 inches of the unguarded edge
of a flat roof, the employer should have foreseen the need for personal
fall protection equipment. However, if the same employees had worked
20 feet from the roof edge, there would not have been an expectancy of a
fall.230
224. Id. at 41-42.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 41.
227. Brooks v. Daniel Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 311, 73 N.C. App. 426, 326 S.E.2d 339 (1985).
228. Id.
229. Id. The generally-phrased standard cited for the "serious" violation was 29 C.F.R.
1926.28(a). The court also rejected the idea that "expert" testimony was required, saying that some
things are a matter of "common sense," which the Board is free to employ.
230. Brooks v. Scott Roofing Co., Inc. 1 NCOSHD 352 (1978), aff'd, Brooks v. E.L. Scott
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(3) For "order pickers" - employees who selected and carried cases of
groceries over their feet - the "reasonable man test" properly estab-
lished a recognizable danger to their feet.231
2-D
Knowledge - Citations for General Duty Clause Violations
The "General Duty Clause" (GDC) requires that each employer af-
firmatively "furnish" employees conditions and a place of employment
free from "recognized" hazards.232 If conditions or a place of employ-
ment contravene the GDC, to support the citation the Commissioner
must: (1) prove that the employer knew that the conduct or condition
(detailed in the citation) existed in the workplace; and (2) prove that the
conduct or condition is "recognized" as a hazard.
Regarding the first requirement, constructive circumstances may im-
pute knowledge of the conduct or condition to the employer.233 Regard
ing the second requirement, the Board may use the "reasonable man"
test to assess employer recognition of the hazard. 234 However, the Board
will attempt to present probative evidence to support its finding.
Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc. 235 illustrates the preceding discussion. There,
a concrete form was placed in vertical position then released from the
crane. The form fell and crushed the employee who had climbed upon it.
As to employer knowledge of the conduct or condition, the Board
found constructive circumstances which imputed knowledge. The em-
ployer had stationed a man at the bottom of the concrete form to help
prevent it from falling.
The requirement of proof that the hazard was "recognized" was satis-
fied by the "reasonable man" standard. The Board found and concluded
that a reasonable, prudent employer within the concrete formwork in-
dustry would have recognized the condition as a hazard.236
Roofing Inc., 2 NCOSHD 211, Docket No. 79 CVS 7047 (Super. Ct. 1980). The generally-phrased
standard was 29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a).
231. Brooks v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 189, 77 N.C. App. 459, 335 S.E.2d 540 (1985),
review denied, 316 N.C. 192, 341 S.E.2d 570 (1986). The generally-pharased standard cited was 29
C.F.R. 1910.132(a).
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(1) (1985). "Each employer shall furnish to each of his employ-
ees conditions of employment and a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious injury or serious harm to his employees."
233. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
234. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 85-1188, Docket No.
8810SC734, - N.C. App. -, 379 S.E.2d 707 (1989).
235. ,2 NCOSHD 584 (RB 1985), aff'd, 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459,
386 S.E.2d 885 (1988).
236. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals endorsed the use of the "reasonable man" test
for assessing whether a hazard was "recognied" as contemplated by the GDC. The court analogized
the GDC's requirements to those of the generally-phrased standard, 29 C.F.R. 1926.28(a) (1988),
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Substantive evidence that the hazard was "recognized" was satisfied by
an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard. The ANSI
standard, which the employer's industry helped develop, provided that




Knowledge - Citations for Repeated Violations
A penalty of up to $10,000 is allowed for each.instance where an em-
ployer is found to violate the Act "repeatedly. '238 Repeated violations
will be either nonserious or serious; thus, proof of the employer's knowl-
edge of the condition will be required.239
There must also be proof of employer knowledge of the standard al-
leged to have been violated. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
written: "We hold that a subsequent violation by the same employer
substantially similar to a prior violation or violations is a repeated viola-
tion only if the employer should have known of the standard by virtue of
the prior citation or citations.
' 240
Earlier, the Review Board had established factors to be considered in
determining employer knowledge of the standard, and the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court specifically adopted those factors as its own. The
factors were: (1) the extent to which the condition was obviously unsafe;
(2) the number of prior substantially similar violations; (3) the proximity
in time to the prior citation; and (4) whether management or key em-
ployees had changed between citations.24'
Two examples of dispositions of repeated citations through considera-
tion of the four preceding factors follow:
[A] The Review Board has affirmed a citation for a repeated violation
because the (a) condition was obviously unsafe,242 (b) the citation was for
the second violative condition, (c) within three years,243 and (d) was
where the "reasonable man" test had previously been used by that court to determine "hazard
recognition."
237. Id.
238. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985). Also see supra text accompanying notes 152-76.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 212-22.
240. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 115, 132, 303 N.C. 573, 590, 281
S.E.2d at 34 (1981). A repeated violation is not defined in the Act, but the Supreme Court said:
"We think the purpose behind the much greater fine for repeated violations is to punish an employer
for failure to comply with a standard about which, because of prior violations, he should be cogni-
zant." Id. at 130, 303 N.C. at 588, 281 S.E.2d at 33.
241. Id.
242. Brooks v. Baker Cammack Hosiery Mills, 2 NCOSHD 94 (RB 1977). The unguarded V-
belt (power transmission apparatus) was seen as an obvious condition to an employer of the respon-
dent's industry.
243. The Board linked the factors of number of prior substantially similar violations and prox-
imity in time: is the subsequent violation "sufficiently close in time to the first violation that it should
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committed by the same "employer."
[B] The North Carolina Supreme Court has vacated a repeated de-
nomination since the conditions attending the prior violation and subject
of the instant citation were varied enough to yield a condition (a) not
obviously unsafe, 2" since the citation was for the (b) second condition,
(c) within two and one-half years; and (d) the "persons in charge of the
jobsites" were not the same.
The factor, "the number of prior substantially similar violations," re-
quires attention to the similarity of the standards involved; 24 5 and to
prior and instant conditions. 24 6  The factor, "whether management .or
key employees had changed between citations," has troubled hearing ex-
aminers. For cogent reasoning on this point, see Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc.,
where the hearing examiner held that the employer, as opposed to vari-
ous job superintendents, is charged with responsibilities under the Act.2 47
Thus, neither a single (preceding) factor nor the sum of several factors
determines employer knowledge for a repeated citation. Rather, the total
effect (synergistic yield) of the combined factors establishes the requisite
proof of employer knowledge.
2-F
Knowledge - Citations for Willful Violations
A penalty of up to $10,000 may be assessed for each instance where an
employer is found to violate the Act "willfully., 248 Normally, only cita-
tions denominated "serious" are also characterized as willful, but cita-
tions may allege that "nonserious" violations were willful. Additionally,
citations may charge a willful violation of the General Duty Clause, and/
or generally-phrased standards, and/or specific standards.249
Knowledge of the Condition
still be in his mind?" Id. at 96. "A second violation of a standard 5 years later might not be a
'repeated' violation but a fifth violation might be a 'repeated' violation even if 5 years elapsed be-
tween the fourth and fifth violation." Id. at 97.
244. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 340 (1981).
The former trench was dug in unstable soil adjacent to a highway; the latter trench was dug in hard,
compact soil. Additionally, the compliance officer had requested that someone get into the trench in
hard, compact soil to help measure it.
245. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 85-1178 (RB 1988).
246. Brooks v. McDevitt & Street Company, 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 87-1347 (RB 1988).
247. 2 NCOSHD 859 (1987). Especially in the construction industry, supervisors come and go.
It was seen as the employers duty to communicate with its supervisory personnel. See also Brooks v.
Electricon, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 1106 (1986). Since the employer and its supervisors had changed
between citations, employer knowledge was not established.
248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-138(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988). See aslo supra text accompanying notes
177-87.
249. Additional requirements for proof of employer knowledge would attach to a citation which
alleged a willful violation of the General Duty Clause or of a generally-phrased standard. See supra
text accompanying notes 103-51.
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Since willful violations will be either nonserious or serious, proof of the
employer's knowledge of the condition will be required. As is true for
other types of violations, the knowledge may be actual or imputed,
through supervisors or constructive circumstances.25 °
Knowledge of the Standard
In Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors,251 the Review Board specifically es-
tablished proof of employer knowledge of the standard itself as being one
of the elements of the commissioner's burden in proving a willful viola-
tion of that standard. Apparently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
agreed:
A violation is deemed to be willful when there is shown "a deliberate
purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to the safety of the person
or property of another;'"
That is, that it was a deliberate disregard of duty, imposed by statute,
regulation or contract, necessary to the safety of a person or property.
252
In holding that the violation was willful, one of the factors which the
court considered was the employer's record of citations for similar viola-
tions.253 Such citations conveyed knowledge of the standard.
For citations alleging willful violations, the Review Board assesses em-
ployer knowledge of the standard by prior citations for the same stan-
dard or for different standards but for similar conditions; by evidence of
management's presence at previous OSHA inspections where similar
conditions existed; and by testimony indicating employer awareness of
the standard.254 Hearing examiners have held top management officials
responsible for disseminating information regarding standards which
prior citations have addressed.255
2-G
Knowledge - Failure to Correct Notices
The severest penalties (up to $1000 per day per violation) may be im-
posed if an employer fails to abate a violation.256 When a "failure-to-
correct" notice is issued, it is founded upon the employer's failure to
bring the condition into compliance with the standard specified in the
250. See supra text accompanying notes 212-22.
251. 2 NCOSHD 237 at 239 (RB 1984).
252. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 529 at 531, 534, 84 N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d
869 (1987), (citing Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 29, 182 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1971)).
253. Id. at 534.
254. Brooks v, O.S. Steel Erectors, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 237 (RB 1984).
255. Brooks v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 1 NCOSHD 1083 (1983); Brooks v. J. F.
Wilkerson Contracting Co., 2 NCOSHD 1119 (1987).
256. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-138(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988).
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original citation.251 7 Thus, employer knowledge of the violative condition
and standard may be presumed. Nevertheless, there are ways in which
the employer can defeat a failure-to-correct notice by establishing its lack
of knowledge.258
II PROVING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defenses to OSHA citations may be classified in numerous ways. "Re-
buttal" defenses, and "affirmative" defenses are illustrative. Here, only
defenses having been characterized by the Safety and Health Review
Board of North Carolina (Review Board, or Board) as "affirmative" are
treated. Thus, respondents are able to plead properly the defenses which
have been named "affirmative." The respondent bears the burden of
proving each affirmative defense which it pleads.259  Affirmative de-
fenses must be raised in the initial pleadings, while other defenses will
arise as rebuttal to elements of proof required to be established by the
complainant. Some defenses are peculiar to the denomination of the vio-
lation as identified in the citation or in the failure to correct notice.
The Affirmative Defense
The Review Board's Rules of Procedure do not define an "affirmative
defense." However, an affirmative defense can be thought of as "new
matter which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to
it."' It is not wholly incorrect to conceptualize the affirmative defense
as a demurrer, in that the defense says "yes, but ... ." It seeks to avoid or
get around the prima facie case.
An obvious example of an affirmative defense is the statute of limita-
tions. Other examples in civil law are the defenses, "assumption of risk,"
and "contributory negligence."26 In OSHA law, in North Carolina,
claims which have been classified by the Review Board as affirmative
defenses include: (A) impossibility of compliance, (B) isolated employee
misconduct, (C) greater hazard, (D) multi-employer worksite, (E) eco-
nomic infeasibility, and (F) the precedence of a specific standard over the
general duty clause.262
If either party elects formal pleadings, an affirmative defense should be
257. Brooks v. Raleigh Tractor & Truck Co., 2 NCOSHD 445 (RB 1983). The prior citation
"effectively gave notice of non-compliance."
258. See M. Smith OSHA Law in North Carolina 75.16 at 96 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
259. R.P. 0514(a). For information about an affirmative defense, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-I, R.
Civ. P. 8(c) (1983).
260. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979).
261. N.C. GEN STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 8(c) (1983).
262. Each is treated below. Impossibility of compliance is almost impossible to establish. Iso-
lated employee misconduct is plead with great frequency.
34
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1989], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol18/iss2/2
O.S.H.A.
pled in the answer to the complaint.263 The failure to plead an affirma-
tive defense in the answer may waive the defense.2"
However, the Review Board clearly prefers to hear matters on the
merits and, in other matters, the Board has been especially lenient with
respect to application of the Rules of Procedure to pro se respondents.265
Attorneys at law should attend to pleadings with greater care than would
be expected of pro se respondents.
Even for legal counsel, many safeguards operate to preserve affirmative
defenses. Prior to or at the hearing, the respondent may move to amend
the pleadings to assert an affirmative defense.266 At the hearing, the ele-
ments of the affirmative defense may necessarily be tried in order to es-
tablish the elements of the burden of proof for a particular citation.
If an affirmative defense is tried without objection, the Review Board
will amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. 267 And, of course,
if the parties are in agreement as to the existence of an affirmative defense
which was tried, whether pled or not, the Board will take cognizance of
the defense.268
The respondent bears the burden of proving each element of any af-
firmative defense it raises. The required quantum of proof is the greater
weight of the evidence.269
A
Impossibility of Compliance
The Review Board has held that: "In establishing the defense of im-
possibility, an employer must prove either (1) that due to the employer's
particular circumstances, it is functionally impossible to comply, or (2)
that compliance would preclude performance of the required work and
263. R.P. .0304(b)(2). If, on the otherhand, neither party elects formal pleadings, then at the
hearing the respondent may freely assert any type of defense.
264. Brooks v. Schloss Outdoor Advertising Co., 2 NCOSHD 552 (RB 1985). For example, the
Board has said of the isolated employee misconduct defense: "There is a recognized defense of
'isolated employee misconduct,' but for it to be available, it must, as an affirmative defense, be pled in
the respondent's answer to the complaint." Id. at 566.
265. Brooks v. Maxton Hardwood Corp., 2 NCOSHD 277 (RB 1981) (ambiguous pleadings and
the scope of the contest); Brooks v. R. N. Rouse & Co., 2 NCOSHD 516 (RB 1983) (timely service
of pleadings).
266. N.C. GEN STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 15 (1983). Since the Rules of Procedure do not address
amendments to the answer, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure govern (R.P. .0102(2));
therefore, the answer may be amended with the consent of the hearing examiner.
267. Brooks v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 432 (RB 1984). At the complain-
ant's motion to foreclose the isolated employee misconduct defense, the Board agreed that having
pled the defense would have "sharpened the issues" but the defense entered without objection: "In
light of the liberal rule with reference to amendment of the pleadings, a rule which should probably
be even more liberal in an administrative context than in general civil litigation, we proceed to
examine the issue." Id. at 435.
268. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 2 NCOSHD 904 (RB 1987).
269. R.P. .0514(a).
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that alternative means of employee protection are not available."27
It is Functionally Impossible to Comply
"Functionally impossible" means that it is physically, or literally, not
possible to comply. It is not easy to prevail ivith that tactic. The em-
ployer in Brooks v. Niemand Industries, Inc. proved to the hearing exam-
iner that it was literally impossible to use safety blocks between the dies
of a power press when adjusting or repairing the press. The decision does
not expatiate, but the absence of physical space was the employer's evi-
dence. The same employer also proved to the hearing examiner that due
to design deficiencies the power press literally could not accommodate
"spring loaded turnover bars," as required by the standard.27" '
More typically, apparent success after asserting functional impossibil-
ity is owed to the complainant's failure to carry the burden of proof.2 72
Compliance Would Preclude the Work and Alternative Means of Em-
ployee Protection are Not Available
This approach to establishing the defense is not fruitful either. Gener-
ally, the defense fails simply because the work can be performed while
complying.273 The employer may confuse "impossibility" with "incon-
venience''274 or with "infeasibility.
275
Unsupported assertions of impossibility are inadequate, as are claims.
that compliance is burdensome, an impediment to production, or costly.
Conversely, adequate proof is demonstrated by actual attempts to com-
ply manifested by changes in the mode of operation and the expenditure
of substantial sums of money to design protective devices.27 6
The respondent in Brooks v. Ralph E Blakely, Jr. prevailed with the
impossibility defense. The company produced pipe organs designed to
270. Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 460, 467 (RB 1983); app. pending
to the Superior Ct. '
271. 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 87-1416 (1989).
272. See, e.g., Brooks v. Gas Spring Co., 2 NCOSHD 947 (1987).
273. See, e.g., Brooks v. Bonitz, Inc., 1 NCOSHD 908 (1984) (it was not "impossible" to guard
the skylight).
274. Brooks v. Ray Erecting Co., I NCOSHD 1129 (1983). It was inconvenient to install alumi-
num panels from a scaffold with a guardrail on its front, but inconvenience is not a defense.
275. Brooks v. The Ceco Corp., 1 NCOSHD 915, 928 (1984). The hearing examiner distin-
guished infeasibility. See supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
276. Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 460 (RB 1983). Part of the em-
ployer's business was devoted to the customized fashioning of metal air conditioning components.
At issue was the press brakes used for the custom work. The array of sized of components and the
range of bends to yield various angles were so great that the hearing examiner concluded that under
existing technology, guarding the press brakes was not possible. On appeal, the Review Board ob-
served that the respondent had not actually attempted to guard the press brakes and had admitted
that guarding for each individual operation was possible. In essence, the respondent's contention
was that having to change guards for each operation would be so impracticable that the work could
not proceed without seriously diminishing the profits of the business.
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last in excess of 300 years. To accomplish the total-customized work an
unguarded radial arm saw was used. The saw was used to make ninety
degree cuts to within 1/64th of an inch of exactness. The respondent
proved that the precision work was not possible if either an opaque or
plexiglass guard were used. Neither party suggested a feasible alternative
to the guards. The training program for operating the saw required the
operator's hands to be at precise. places at specific times. No other per-
son was allowed to talk to-an employee in the act of operating the saw.
Any violation of the safety rules resulted in immediate job termination.
There was proof that the discipline had been enforced.277
Proving that compliance would preclude the work is essentially a re-
quirement of the variance procedures. Thus, in Brooks v. Austin Berry-
hill Fabricators, Inc. the Review Board held that in any case "in which
the employer asserts the defense of impossibility, the employer must have
applied for a variance and had a decision rendered on its application."27'
Subsequently, the Review Board Chairman issued an order directing
hearing examiners to consider impossibility defenses "unfettered" by the




Isolated Employee Misconduct - Nonsupervisory Employees
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that:
In order to show that the safety violation was the result of isolated em-
ployee misconduct, the employer must show that it had taken all feasible
steps to prevent an accident from occurring; that the employee action
was contrary to an effectively communicated and enforced work rule; and
that the employer had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the
violation.28 °
The Employer.has Taken all Feasible Steps to Prevent an Accident [a Vio-
lation]from Occurring
277. 1 NCOSHD 948 (1983) (rendered prior to Brooks v. Austin-Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 2
NCOSHD 460 (RB 1983)).
278. 2 NCOSHD 460, 470 (RB 1983).
279. Brooks v. Hercules Steel Co., Inc., 2 NCOSHD 567, 570 (RB Chairman 1985). Regarding
variances, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-132 (1985). The utility of the variance application requirement
is that if a variance is denied, the impossibility defense would still be available. Also, both parties
and the Board should gain from the record established during the variance application process.
However, use of the variance application during litigation is questionable. The Act clearly seeks to
encourage pre-inspection compliance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(2)(a), (d) and (i) (1981). Al-
lowing employers to wait until cited to apply for a variance might frustrate the Act. Further, De-
partment of Labor regulations allow the Commissioner the latitude to decline to consider a variance
application regarding matter being litigated (13 NCAC 7B.0405). [NCAC refers to the North Caro-
lina Administrative Code, which is analogous to the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)]
280. Brooks v. O.S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 529, 534, 84 N.C. App. 630, 635, 353 S.E.2d
869, 873 (1987).
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This first element focuses upon the employer's safety program and
work rules.2 81 The element derives from recognition that neither due
process nor the Act imposes a strict liability standard upon the employer
for its employees' safety and health.
Thus, historically, the Review Board has required proof that employ-
ers have "done everything possible to persuade their employees to com-
ply" with the Act,2 82 while recognizing that employee conduct may also
be unforeseeable. The Board has consistently held that an employer can-
not be expected to foresee employee behavior which appears to be "inten-
"1283 284tonltionally dangerous, or intentionally reckless.2 84 Such expectancy
would be beyond the pale of feasibility.
In summary, the employer must present evidence of a safety program
or work rule which addresses the subject of the violation and seeks to
prevent it.
The Employee Action was Contrary to an Effectively Communicated Work
Rule
It is possible for an informal safety program to be effective and effec-
tively communicated.28 5 However, the court will look for evidence of a
clearly stated work rule. 28 6 Thus, a written formal safety rule will im-
prove the employer's chances of surviving this second element of proof of
the isolated employee misconduct defense.
Brook v. George W Kane, Inc. 287 illustrates effectively communicated
work rules:
* A safety program was in effect at the time of the inspection and for
years prior to it;
* A scheduled company safety newsletter which discussed the subject of
the citation had been distributed to employees;
* The company safety policy and newsletter regarding the subject of the
citation were posted at the worksite where the inspection took place;
0 The respondent had conducted scheduled on-the-job safety meetings,
wherein the subject of the citation had been discussed;
0 Each employee was required to and did sign a statement pledging com-
pliance with company and OSHA safety rules.
The Employee Action was Contrary to an Effectively Enforced Work Rule
A record of a formal warning of dismissal for violation of the safety
281. Brooks v. C.P. Buckner Steel Erection, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 432 (RB 1984).
282. Nye v. Stewart Warner Corp., 2 NCOSHD 46, 49 (RB 1976).
283. Nye v. Peden Steel Co., 2 NCOSHD 37, 42 (RB 1976).
284. Nye v. Wadsworth Wrecking Co., 2 NCOSHD 50 (RB 1977).
285. See Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 227 (RB 1981).
286. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 529, 84 N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 869 (1987).
287. 2 NCOSHD 79 (RB 1977).
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rule at issue is persuasive.2"8 Evidence of disciplinary action against em-
ployees who were involved in conduct leading to previous similar cita-
tions is persuasive.28 9 Unsubstantiated claims that employees have been
dismissed for prior similar conduct are not persuasive.29°
Employee Carelessness and Negligence
To be enforced, the work rule must be enforceable; it must work. A
work rule cannot work to forestall accidental behavior. Further, the Act
extends to some degree of human carelessness. "Some carelessness and
negligence is anticipated and expected, as standards requiring perimeter
guarding and first-aid attest. ' 291 Even conduct approaching "contribu-
tory negligence" may be protected if, for example, the employer fails to
provide the equipment and training needed to work safely.292
Particularly inept are oral work rules of a general nature, against care-
less or accidental behavior. Instructions to "work safely" or "not to
make sudden movements" are not enforceable.29 a
The Employer had Neither Actual nor Constructive Knowledge of the
Violation 
294
Of special significance with regard to this element is evidence of the
employer's efforts to discover violations. Inadequate supervision, evi-
dence of a failure to enforce the safety rule, and "widespread and bla-
tant" noncompliance are proof that the violation was not
idiosyncratic.2 95
B-2
Isolated Employee Misconduct - Supervisory Employees
Because the absence of employer knowledge is central to the claim of
isolated employee misconduct, the defense has not been readily available
for supervisory employees. In 1978, the Review Board held that: "[A]
job foreman in charge of the actual performance of the employees, is a
direct representative of the management of the company. Accordingly,
the indifference of a foreman to the requirement of the Occupational
288. Id.
289. Brooks v. 0. S. Steel Erectors, 2 NCOSHD 529, N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 869 (1987).
290. Brooks v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 432 (RB 1984).
291. Nye v. Wadsworth Wrecking Co., 2 NCOSHD 50, 54 (RB 1977).
292. For an eloquent discussion on point, see the dissenting opinion in Nye v. Peden Steel Co., 2
NCOSHD 37, 45 (RB 1976) (Denson, Alexander B., dissenting).
293. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 584 (RB 1985), aff'd 3 NCOSHD -, 91 N.C. App.
459, 372 S.E.2d 342 (1988). The court found it significant that the experienced employee's history
did not reveal a proclivity for reckless behavior.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 213-22.
295. Brooks v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 432 (RB 1984).
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Safety and Health Act will be consistently imputed to the employer. 296
Subsequently, an employer failed to prove the defense because the al-
leged misconduct was not an "isolated, unpredicted, idiosyncratic act on
the part of the employee." However, the decision did not focus on the
employee's status as a foreman.297
In 1985 the Board reviewed its early-stated position regarding imputed
knowledge and observed that: "The Board is compelled to agree that the
on-site job foreman's conduct must be imputable where, as here, he
clearly is acting within the specific limits of the authority delegated to
him by the employer's management."
298
Two years later an employer prevailed with the defense with respect to
its foreman. The majority-opinion commented that acts of the foreman
are not imputed to the employer, "where the agent acts outside the scope
of the authority delegated to him by the principal, i.e., his employer,
where his acts or omissions are not authorized by the principal, or when
his acts are not thereafter actually or constructively ratified by the
principal. 
299
The decision employed the same test for the defense as used for nonsu-
pervisory employees.
Hearing examiners have not been comfortable with the defense vis-d-
vis supervisors. Denying the defense may impose a strict liability stan-
dard. Allowing the defense strikes at the traditional view that the super-
visor acts in place of the employer.
One hearing examiner resolved the seeming dilemma by allowing the
defense only where the employer can "show affirmatively that such su-
pervisory personnel concealed or failed to report such conditions....
C
Greater Hazard
"Greater hazard," is an affirmative defense, 30 1 so normally it must be
pled in the answer. Yet, if the alleged violation is of a "general" stan-
296. Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 2 NCOSHD 98, 103 (RB 1978), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 108,
49 N.C. App. 352, 271 S.E.2d 564 (1980), rev'd, 2 NCOSHD 115, 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24
(1981).
297. Brooks v. Clear-Day, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 536 (RB 1984).
298. Brooks v. Schloss Outdoor Advertising Co., 2 NCOSHD 552, 565 (RB 1985).
299. Brooks v. Floyd S. Pike Electricial Contractors, 2 NCOSHD 1170, 1176 (RB 1987), (Cur-
tis, M., dissenting). The employer's reliance upon the foreman's extensive experience played. a key
part in forestalling knowledge.
300. Brooks v. Steel & Tank Service Co., I NCOSHD 632, 633, 635 (1981). But see contra
Brooks v. Williams Electric Co., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 88-1450 (1988), where the defense was
denied even where the supervisor was shown to have falsified records to preclude employer knowl-
edge. The hearing examiner reasoned that the area supervisor had constructive knowledge in that,
with reasonable diligence, he could have known of the field supervisor's omissions.
301. Brooks v. Trout & Riggs Constr. Co., 2 NCOSHD 395, 398 (RB 1982).
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dard, the defense may enter into evidence in the form of rebuttal.3 °2
The Review Board has held that to prove the greater hazard defense,
the employer must: (1) establish that it applied for a variance or that a
variance would have been inapplicable; and (2) prove that the "hazard of
compliance is greater than the hazard of noncompliance.
3 °3
Application for a Variance or Proving its Inapplicability
The requirement to apply for a variance relates to citations for viola-
tions of specific standards.3 °" In general, the variance application process
requires the employer to prove that it is unable to comply, that its em-
ployees are otherwise protected, and that it is pursuing a program to
come into compliance.3"'
The Hazard of Compliance is Greater than the Hazard of Noncompliance
Evidence to establish this element of the defense will include data rela-
tive to "the probability, frequency, or severity of any injury" expected
from compliance.3" 6 Unsupported speculation as to the hazards of com-
pliance is not persuasive.30 7
Most decisions involving the greater hazard defense were rendered by
hearing examiners and prior to the date at which the Board established
the elements of the defense. Nonetheless, a review of several decisions is
instructive.
A hearing examiner has held that requiring employees to wear rubber
gloves for working on energized electric lines posed greater hazards.
Without the gloves, the experienced men would avoid the power lines.
With the gloves, moisture from sweating hands posed a hazard; or unbe-
knownst to the user, the gloves could wear through.30 8
A fall protection method suggested by the Commissioner was shown
to pose a greater hazard. Using the suggested method, had one employee
fallen off of the roof, he would have dragged other employees with
him. 309
A hearing examiner has held that covering a pit in the floor of a saw-
mill would have provided a surface from which broken and detached saw
302. Nye v. Mitchell Engineering Co., 2 NCOSHD 23 (RB 1976). When the citation is for the
alleged violation of a "general" standard, the Commissioner must prove the feasibility of abatement.
See supra text accompanying notes 103-06. Thus, the employer can rebut the complainant's prima
facie proof of feasibility by showing that compliance by the suggested method would be a greater
hazard.
303. Brooks v. Bonitz Insulation Co., 2 NCOSHD 350, 354 (RB 1985).
304. Id. Logically, a variance would be inapposite to a general standard.
305. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-132(a) and (b) (1985).
306. Brooks v. Bonitz Insulation Co., 2 NCOSHD 350, 355 (RB 1985).
307. Nye v. Cieszko Constr. Co., I NCOSHD 172 (1977).
308. Nye v. Duke Power Co., 1 NCOSHD 141, modified, 2 NCOSHD 74 (RB 1977).
309. Nye v. Mitchell Engineering Co., 2 NCOSHD 23 (RB 1976).
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blades could ricochet into employees. The fall hazard which the citation
addressed clearly posed the lesser threat.31
D
Multi-Employer Worksite
The Review Board has addressed the multi-employer worksite defense.
"The multi-employer worksite defense absolves an employer who neither
created nor controlled the hazard if either (1) the employer did not know
of the hazard and could not have known with reasonable diligence or (2)
the employer took reasonable alternative measures to ensure the safety of
its workers."3
More recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals characterized the
defense in this manner:
The general rule as to employer culpability for safety violations is that
each employer is responsible for the safety of his own employees....
However, this rule has been modified in cases involving multi-employer
work sites. An employer is expected to make reasonable efforts to detect
and abate any violation of safety standards of which it is aware and to
which its employees are exposed despite the fact that the employer did
not commit the violation.
312
Both the Review Board and the court of appeals bring into question the
elements of employer knowledge, employee exposure, control/creation of
the hazard, and alternative measures taken to ensure employees' safety.
Multi-Employer Worksite and Employer Knowledge
Perhaps the most efficacious tack for the employer is to establish its
lack of knowledge. The burden is lessened somewhat since the work set-
ting involves numerous types of specialized knowledge.
The employer simply may not have the requisite expertise to be aware
of a hazard. Thus, a carpenter successfully asserted that it could not
have known of a particular electrical hazard.313 A general contractor
proved it could not have known of a defective tar kettle a lessor had
furnished an independent contractor at the general contractor's
worksite.314
Similarly, employers at multi-employer sites are entitled to rely upon
the plans and specifications of licensed professionals. "There is nothing
in the record to suggest that a reasonably prudent person should not rely
on a structural design prepared by competent licensed professionals. To
310. Brooks v. Wade Wood, Inc., I NCOSHD 656 (1981).
311. Brooks v. Budd Piper Roofing Co., 2 NCOSHD 323, 328 (RB 1983).
312. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 468, 469,
372 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1988).
313. Brooks v. Kay Building Co., I NCOSHD 1135 (1983).
314. Brooks v. L. P. Cox Co. of Concord, 2 NCOSHD 836 (1986).
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hold otherwise would cause chaos in the construction industry without
materially improving safety." ''
Multi-Employer Worksite and Employee Exposure
A citation for an alleged violation of the General Duty Clause is only
issued to the employer, proper, whose employees are exposed to the haz-
ard.3" 6 For the alleged violation of an OSHA standard, the employer
must show that its employees were neither exposed nor had "access" to
the hazard." 7 The employer which can establish that its employees were
not exposed and did not have access must also be prepared to show that
it did not create or control the hazard. If it created or controlled the
hazard, the defense may be unsuccessful though the only exposed em-
ployees were those of another employer.3" 8
There has not been a case to assess the citation of a general contractor
which neither controlled the hazard nor had employees exposed. How-
ever, hearing examiners frequently note that general contractors have the
ultimate responsibility for the worksite and all who work there.
319
Multi-Employer Worksite - Control/Creation of the Hazard
Before the employer can proceed to show how it alternatively pro-
tected its employees from a hazard, it must establish that it did not create
the hazard. It must also show that it did not have the capacity to abate
(control) the hazard.
Employers frequently assert that since hazardous equipment which its
employees used belonged to another employer, it neither created nor con-
trolled the hazard. The question of ownership is not determinative,
however. 320
Multi-Employer Worksite and Alternative Employee Protection
Having established the inability to control the hazard, the respondent
must show its reasonable attempt to provide alternative protection for
employees who were exposed to the hazard. It does not matter that the
violation was of nonserious gravity.321 Yet it is reasonable to expect that
315. Brooks v. L. P. Cox Co., 2 NCOSHD 637, 644 (RB 1985), 2 NCOSHD 645, Docket 85
CVS 9029 (Super. Ct. 1987).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 126-51.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 87-101.
318. See Brooks v. McDevitt & Street Co., 1 NCOSHD 1209 (1985). The general contractor
controlled the hazard and knew that subcontractors' employees were exposed. See also Brooks v.
Waco Electrical Co., 2 NCOSHD 570 (1985). The electrical subcontractor created the hazard to
which the brick mason's employees were exposed.
319. See. e.g., Brooks v. Precision Walls, Inc., I NCOSHD 799 (1982); Brooks v. Homeowner's
Carpet Warehouse, I NCOSHD 479 (1979).
320. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 3 NCOSHD -, OSHANC 83-1039, 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d
342 (1988).
321. Brooks v. Waco Elec. Co., 2 NCOSHD 570 (1985) (nonserious electrical hazard).
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the extent of efforts to afford alternative protection would correlate posi-
tively with the gravity of the condition.322
Subcontractors can show an attempt to have the general contractor
correct the condition. If unsuccessful, the subcontractor must prove that
it did something.323 For example, the subcontractor might have directed
employees not to work in the hazardous area.324 Undoubtedly, many
problems could be avoided if the contract clarified responsibilities and
attending expenses for employees' safety.325
E
Economic Infeasibility
Economic infeasibility is available to employers as an affirmative de-
fense. The Review Board has quoted with favor federal-OSHA law
which said: "The defense of economic infeasibility may be established if
the employer can demonstrate that it is unable to absorb the costs for
compliance and is unable to include the costs for compliance as a neces-
sary expense.
326
Proving economic infeasibility is not easy.32 7 The reason it proves dif-
ficult is that OSHA contemplates that in most instances compliance is a
normal cost of business for all within a given industry.3 28 Nonetheless, it
is possible to show that compliance technology within the economic abil-
ity of one employer may be prohibitive to another.3 29
F
Precedence of a Standard Over the General Duty Clause
Due process considerations require the Commissioner to cite a specific
standard, if one is available. If the employer is cited under the General
Duty Clause,331 it may plead, then prove it was erroneously cited, if a
standard applies. However, that defense is limited by the extent to which
the standard specifically covers the hazard in question.331
322. Brooks v. Hamlin Roofing Co., 3 NOOSHD -, OSHANC 88-1485 (1988) (unguarded roof
opening through which an employee fell to his death).
323. Brooks v. Independent. Testing Lab., 2 NCOSHD 222 (RB 1979).
324. Brooks v. S. & S Elec., 2 NCOSHD 1211 (1987).
325. Id.
326. Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 2 NCOSHD 460, 469 (RB 1983).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
328. Brooks v. Scott Roofing Co., 1 NCOSHD 352 (1978), aff'd, 2 NCOSHD 211, Docket No.
79 CvS 7047 (Superior Ct. 1980).
329. Brooks v. Cool Springs Lumber Co., 2 NCOSHD 848 (RB 1987). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 107-18.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 126-51.
331. Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 3 NCOSHD -, - N.C. App. -, 379 S.E.2d 707 (1989).
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